Abstract. This article determines the weakest failure detectors to implement shared atomic objects in a distributed system with crash-prone processes. We first determine the weakest failure detector for the basic register object. We then use that to determine the weakest failure detector for all popular atomic objects including test-and-set, fetch-and-add, queue, consensus and compareand-swap, which we show is the same. 
Introduction
A shared atomic object is a data structure exporting a set of operations that can be invoked by concurrent processes. Atomicity means that every object operation appears to execute at some individual instant between its invocation and reply time events [Lamport 1986; Herlihy and Wing 1990] . Many distributed algorithms are designed assuming atomic objects as underlying synchronization primitives. These include objects of types register, test-and-set, fetch-and-add, queue, consensus, and compare-and-swap.
We study necessary and sufficient conditions for implementing atomic object types in software assuming processes can communicate by message passing, that is, with no actual shared physical memory. Through such implementations, algorithms based on shared atomic objects can be automatically emulated in a message passing system.
CONTEXT. We consider a distributed system where processes communicate through reliable channels but can fail by crashing. If it crashes, a process halts its activities. Otherwise, it does not deviate from the algorithm assigned to it. We study robust [Attiya et al. 1995] implementations where any process that invokes an object operation and does not crash eventually gets a reply.
If the distributed system provides no information about failures, then two fundamental results are known about atomic object implementations. (1) The type register can be implemented if and only if a minority of the processes can crash [Attiya et al. 1995] , and (2) we cannot implement any of the types test-and-set, fetchand-add, queue, compare-and-swap and consensus, even if only one process may crash [Herlihy 1991; Fischer et al. 1985; Loui and Abu-Amara 1987] . On the other hand, if we can assume a perfect failure detection mechanism that provides the processes with the ability to accurately detect crashes, then all these objects can be implemented irrespective of the number of processes that can crash.
It is natural thus to ask what amount of failure information is actually necessary and sufficient to implement such atomic objects. The question can be expressed precisely using the notion of failure detector reduction introduced in . Failure detectors can indeed be viewed as abstract oracles that output information about crashes, and they can be precisely compared. Basically, a failure detector D is said to be stronger than a failure detector D if there is a distributed algorithm that uses D to emulate the output of D (D is said to be weaker than D) .
It was shown in that, assuming only a minority of processes can crash, the weakest failure detector to implement consensus is an oracle which outputs, at any time and at every process, a single leader process such that, eventually, this leader does never crash and is permanently the same at all processes . The meaning that is the weakest to implement consensus (assuming only a minority of processes can crash) is twofold: (a) there is a distributed algorithm that implements consensus using (assuming only a minority of processes can crash), and (b) for every failure detector D such that some algorithm implements consensus using D, D is stronger than . Given that the compare-and-swap type can emulate the consensus type, and consensus can emulate any atomic object type if only a minority of processes can crash [Herlihy 1991] , is thus also the weakest to implement the compare-and-swap type if only a minority of processes can crash. The general questions remained however open:
-What is the weakest failure detector for all other object types? For instance, types like queue, test-and-set, or fetch-and-add are, in a precise sense, less powerful than consensus: they can emulate consensus in a subsystem of two processes but cannot in any subsystem of more than two processes (unlike compare-and-swap [Herlihy 1991] ). These types have consensus number 2 in the parlance of Herlihy [1991] . On other hand, compare-and-swap has consensus number n in any system of n processes. It is natural to seek for the weakest failure detector to implement objects with consensus number k < n; one would expect such a weakest failure detector to be strictly weaker than . -What if half of the processes can crash? As we pointed out, the basic type register cannot be implemented if there is no failure information and half of the processes might crash: it is thus natural to seek for the weakest failure detector to implement the register type in case half of the processes can crash? In this case, it is also known that does not implement consensus . So what is the weakest failure detector to implement consensus (and other object types) if half of the processes might crash?
CONTRIBUTIONS. This article closes the general questions above. We determine the weakest failure detectors to implement the basic type register as well as any object type with consensus number 1 < k ≤ n, that is, including types like consensus, compare-and-swap, queue, test-and-set and fetch-and-add. We do so in any environment , that is, given any assumption about the number and timing of process failures, and for any subset of processes in the system.
We proceed as follows. Considering any environment and any subset S of processes in the system:
(1) We first determine (1) the weakest failure detector to implement a register shared by processes in S, and then we derive from it (2) the weakest failure detector to implement a consensus shared by processes in S.
-The first failure detector, denoted by S , outputs, at any time and at every process of S, a set of processes such that (a) any two sets always intersect and (b) eventually every set contains only processes that never crash. -The second failure detector, which we denote by S * S , outputs, at any time and at every process of S, both outputs of failure detector S and a failure detector, which we introduce here and we denote by S . Failure detector S outputs, at any time and at every process of S, a single leader process, such that, eventually this leader is the same at all processes of S and does never crash. (2) We then show that for any integer 1 < k ≤ n, the weakest failure detector to implement any type shared by processes in S that emulates consensus among k processes is also S * S .
INTERPRETATIONS
-Failure detector S encapsulates the exact information about failures needed to implement a basic shared memory abstraction made by registers over a subset S of processes communicating by message passing. This generalizes in a precise sense the result of Attiya et al. [1995] . In particular, assuming at most a minority of processes can crash, , the restriction of S to the case where S is the entire system, can indeed be implemented directly with message passing (with no failure information). -Identifying failure detector S * S generalizes, for any subset of processes and any environment, the fundamental result of . Indeed, assuming at most a minority of processes can crash, * , the restriction of S * S to the case where S is the entire system, is equivalent to ]. -Our result that, for any 1 < k ≤ n, the weakest failure detector to implement any type that emulates consensus among k processes is also * , reveals the interesting fact that the notion of consensus number [Herlihy 1991; Jayanti 1993] (as long as it is strictly higher than 1) of a type has no impact on the information about failures needed to implement this type. For instance, the information about failures that is necessary and sufficient to implement a type like queue and testand-set over message passing, is the same as the information that is necessary and sufficient to implement types like compare-and-swap and consensus.
More generally, and given that most synchronization problems can be cast as atomic types, our result means that, as long as failure detection is concerned, adopting an ad-hoc approach focusing on each problem individually is not better than a general approach where the failure detector * would be implemented as a common service underlying all problems, that is, all type implementations.
ROADMAP. The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 defines our model. Section 3 introduces failure detectors S and S , then establishes some preliminary results about the characteristics of these failure detectors. Section 4 determines the weakest failure detector to implement a register. Section 5 determines the weakest failure detector to implement atomic types with a consensus number k > 1. Section 6 compares failure detectors and . Section 7 concludes the article.
System Model
Stating and proving our result goes through defining a general model of distributed computation encompassing different kinds of abstractions: atomic objects, message passing and failure detectors. Our model, and in particular our notion of implementation, is a generalization of both the notions of shared memory object implementations of Herlihy [1991] as well as failure detector reductions of .
We consider a distributed system composed of a finite set of n processes = {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n }; | | = n ≥ 2. (Sometimes, processes are denoted by p and q.) A discrete global clock is assumed, and , the range of the clock's ticks, is the set of natural numbers. The global clock is not accessible to the processes.
FAILURE PATTERNS AND FAILURE HISTORIES.
A process does never deviate from the algorithm assigned it (no Byzantine failures) except if it crashes, in which case it simply halts any activity. A process p is said to be crashed at time τ if p does not perform any action after time τ (the notion of action is defined below). Otherwise; the process is said to be alive at time τ . Failures are permanent, that is, no process recovers after a crash. A correct process is a process that does never crash (otherwise, it is faulty).
A failure pattern is a function F from to 2 , where F(τ ) denotes the set of processes that have crashed by time τ . The set of correct processes in a failure pattern F is noted correct (F) . As in , we assume that every failure pattern has at least one correct process. An environment is a set of failure patterns. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, our results are stated for all environments. The environment consisting of the set of failure patterns where at most t processes crash (0 < t ≤ n) is denoted E t .
Roughly speaking, a failure detector D is a distributed oracle that gives hints about failure patterns of a given environment E. 
This notation is naturally extended to a finite set of failure detectors K :
2.2. ACTIONS, RUNS AND SCHEDULES. To access its local state or shared services, a process p executes (deterministic) actions from a (possibly infinite) alphabet A p . Each action is associated with exactly one process and the set of all actions A is a disjoint union of sets of alphabets, each associated to a given process A p i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). The state of a process after it executes action a in state s, is denoted a(s). A configuration C is a function mapping each process to its local state. When applied to a configuration C, action a of A p i gives a new unique configuration denoted a(C):
An infinite sequence of actions is called a schedule. In the following, Sc[i] denotes the i-th action of schedule Sc. Given seq = a 1 · · · a i a i+1 a prefix of a schedule and C a configuration, the new configuration seq(C) resulting from the execution seq on some C is defined by induction as a i+1 ((a 1 . . . a i )(C)). To each schedule Sc = a 1 · · · a i a i+1 · · · and configuration C 0 correspond a unique sequence of configurations
A run is a tuple α =< F, C, Sc, T >, where F is a failure pattern, C a configuration, Sc a schedule, and T a time assignment represented by an infinite sequence of increasing values such that:
) and (2) if p is correct then p executes an infinite number of actions. An event e is the occurrence of an action in Sc, and if e is the kth action in Sc, then T [k] is the time at which event e is executed.
Consider an alphabet of actions A and any subset B of A. Let Sc|B be the subsequence of Sc consisting only of the actions of B, and T |B be the subsequence of T corresponding to actions of B in α =< F, C, Sc, T >. We call < F, C, Sc|B, T |B > the history corresponding to B, and we simply denote it by α|B. In particular, when B = A p i , Sc|A p i , T |A p i , α|A p i are the restrictions to the process p i ; α|A p i is called the history of process p i in α.
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In the following, by abuse of language, we simply denote the restrictions to the process p i by Sc| p i , T | p i , and α| p i .
2.3. SERVICES. In this article, we consider three kinds of services: message passing channels, atomic objects and failure detectors. A service is defined by a pair (Prim, Spec) . Each element of Prim, denoted by prim, is a tuple < s, p, arg, ret > representing an action of process p identified by a sort s, an input argument arg from some (possibly infinite) range In and an output argument (or return value) ret from some (possibly infinite) range Out. An empty argument is denoted by λ. The specification Spec of a service X is defined by a set of runs.
2.3.1. Message Passing. The classical notion of point-to-point message passing channel, represented here by a service and denoted MP, is defined through primitive send(m) to q of process p and primitive receive() from q of process p. More formally, these primitives are respectively a tuple < send to q, p, m, λ > with m ∈ M where M is a set of messages and a tuple < receive from q, p, λ, x > with x ∈ M ∪ {λ}.
Primitive receive() from q returns either some message m or the null message λ; in the first case we say that p received m. Each non null message is uniquely identified and has a unique sender as well as a unique potential receiver. The specification Spec of MP stipulates that: (1) the receiver of m receives it at most once and only if the sender of m has sent m; (2) if process p is correct and if process q executes an infinite number of receive() from p primitives, then all messages sent by p to q are received by q. 2.3.3. Atomic Object. Atomic objects are specific kinds of services exporting a set of operations defined by a sequential specification. Such a specification stipulates the values to be returned by the object's operations when invoked by non-concurrent processes. Each occurrence of an operation is realized through two actions: an invocation (i.e., a tuple < op invoke , p, arg, λ > where op is the operation and arg the argument of the operation op) and a reply (i.e., a tuple < op reply , p, λ, ret > where ret is the value return by the operation op). The sequential specification of an atomic object is defined by an initial state of the object as well as a type.
A type T is a tuple < Q, Inv, Rep, L >: where Q is the set of states of the type, Inv is a set of invocations, Rep is a set of replies, and L is a relation that carries each state st of the object, st ∈ Q and invocation op of Inv to a set of state and reply pairs, which are said to be legal, and denoted by L (st, op) . When L is a function, the type is said to be deterministic. An invocation inv and a reply rep are said to be matching if they are actions of the same process p and if there exist states st and st such that (st , rep) belongs to L (st, inv We say that some occurrence of invocation is pending in a schedule if it has no matching reply in that schedule. Consider a schedule Sc, and its restriction Sc| p to a process p. We say that Sc is well formed if (1) no prefix of Sc| p has more than one occurrence of a pending invocation and (2) (Sc| p)|Prim begins with an invocation and has alternating matching invocations and replies. By extension, a run α =< F, C, Sc, T > is well formed if its schedule Sc is well formed and there is no pending invocation for correct processes in F. Only well formed schedules and runs are considered.
When reasoning about the atomicity of an object, we consider only operations that terminate, that is, both invocation inv and the matching reply have taken place. If a process p performs an invocation inv and then p crashes before getting any reply, we assume that either the state of the object appears as if inv has not taken place, or inv has indeed terminated. An operation is said to precede another if the first terminates before the second starts. Two operations are concurrent if none precedes the other.
Let α =< F, C, Sc, T > be any well formed run of an algorithm. Remember that C is an initial configuration, and configurations represent the state of the system, including the states of its objects. Let α|Prim be the history corresponding to object O =< Prim, Spec > of type T , a linearization of α|Prim with respect to T and state s is a pair (H, T ) such that: (1) H is a sequential history of O from state s; (2) H includes all nonpending invocations of operation in Sc; (3) If some invocation inv is pending in Sc, then either H does not include this pending invocation or includes a matching reply; (4) H includes no action other than the ones mentioned in (2) and (3); (5) 
Sc is a schedule applicable to configuration C, such that α satisfies the specifications of services in Serv.
Roughly speaking, implementing a service X using a set of services Serv means providing the code of a set of subtasks associated with every process: one subtask for each primitive sort of X as well as a set of additional subtasks. The subtasks associated to the primitives are assumed to be sequential in the following sense: if a process p executes a primitive prim (of the service to be implemented), the process launches the associated subtask and waits for it to terminate and returns a reply before executing another primitive. All subtasks use services in Serv to implement service X , in the sense that the only primitives used in these subtasks are primitives defined in Serv. More precisely, an implementation of a service X =< Prim, Spec > with primitives of sorts ps 1 , . . . , ps m , using a set of services Serv, among n processes, is defined by
. . , ps n m )) > where, for each i, X i is the implementation subtask of p i and ps i j is the primitive implementation subtask associated to process p i and the primitive of sort ps j of X such that the only primitives occurring in these subtasks are primitives defined in Serv.
An implementation I (X, n, Serv) for environment E ensures that for each In this article, we study robust implementations of services [Attiya et al. 1995] : every correct process that executes a primitive of an implemented service eventually gets a reply from that invocation. We will sometimes focus on implementations of S-services: the primitives of such a service can only be invoked by processes of a subset S of the system. In such implementations, the only restriction is the fact that only the processes in S contain each one subtask per primitive sort of the S-service (but all processes contain implementation tasks). If we do not specify the subset S, we implicitly assume the set of all processes.
2.5. WEAKEST FAILURE DETECTOR. The notion of failure detector D2 being reducible to D1 in a given environment E means in our context that there is an implementation of D2 using D1 and MP in E. Failure detector D1 is said to be stronger than D2 in E and written D2 E D1. All implementation subtasks use only MP and D. We say that D1 is equivalent to
We say that a failure detector D 1 and MP implement a given service (in environment E) if there is an algorithm that uses D 1 and MP to implement that service (in E).
We say that a failure detector D 1 is the weakest to implement a given service in environment E if and only if the two following conditions are satisfied: (1) there is an implementation of the service using D 1 and MP in E, and (2) if there is an algorithm that implements the service using some failure detector
IMPLICIT ASSUMPTIONS. As pointed out earlier, most of our results hold for all environments. Hence, unless explicitly stated otherwise, we will not assume any specific environment In particular, we use the notation D2 D1 to mean D2 E D1 in every environment E. Similarly, as most of our implementations use MP, unless explicitly stated otherwise, we will implicitly assume MP in the services that are used by our implementations.
The Quorum and Leader Failure Detectors
We introduce here two new failure detectors: the Quorum and the Leader. Both are defined relatively to a subset of processes S in the system. The first one is denoted by S . The second one, denoted by S , generalizes failure detector introduced in .
We prove some properties of the composition of these failure detectors, which will be useful in proving some of the main results of this article (Corollary 7 and Corollary 2).
3.1. FAILURE DETECTOR S . Basically, given any subset S of processes in , failure detector S outputs, at each process in S, and at any time, a list of processes, called trusted processes, such that (a) every list intersects with every other list, ever output at any time and any process, and (b) eventually, all lists contain only correct processes.
More precisely, failure detector S outputs, to processes in S, lists of processes that satisfy the two following properties: -Intersection. Every two lists of trusted processes intersect:
Eventually, every list of processes trusted by a correct process contains only correct processes:
To simplify the definition, we consider that, at any process of S that has crashed, the list that is output is simply .
It is easy to see that can easily be implemented in an asynchronous message passing system assuming the majority environment (we give a simple algorithm in Section 6).
The following proposition is a direct consequence of the definition of : PROPOSITION 1. Let S be any subset of and let L be any family of subsets of S such that, for all p, q ∈ S, there exists L ∈ L such that p ∈ L and q ∈ L. We have: S ≡ * { X |X ∈ L}.
An interesting particular case is where subsets X are pairs, that is, for any S ⊆ , S ≡ * { { p,q} | p, q ∈ S}. The composition of all S , over all subsets S of size 2, is in this case :
3.2. FAILURE DETECTOR S . Given any subset S of processes in , failure detector S outputs at any time and at any process, one process called the leader, such that all processes inside S eventually get the same correct leader. More precisely, assuming at least one correct process in the system, the following property is satisfied:
Note that processes outside S might never get the same leader or might permanently get crashed leaders. Note also that the leader process that is output (in particular to processes in S) does not need to be in S: it can be any process in . Failure detector from corresponds to . We state and prove below a useful property of the composition of S failure detectors over several subsets S. This property will be key to show later that the weakest failure detector to implement all objects with consensus number k > 1 is the same. PROPOSITION 3. Let L be any family of subsets of such that, for all p, q ∈ , there exists some L ∈ L such that p ∈ L and q ∈ L. We have: ≡ * { L |L ∈ L}.
PROOF. As is also L for every L ⊆ , we directly get: * { L |L ∈ L} . Proving that * { L |L ∈ L} is more involved. The idea is for the processes to collectively use the outputs of their L failure detectors in order to construct a directed graph (digraph), and then use this graph to eventually extract the same correct process.
Consider any failure pattern F. Consider the digraph G =< V, E > for which V = correct(F), and ( p, q) ∈ E if and only if q is eventually permanently leader for p for some L such that p ∈ L. For all correct processes p, q, by definition of L, there is at least one L, say L pq , within L such that p and q both belong to L pq . Hence, there is a correct process x (the leader of p and q for this L pq ) such that both ( p, x) and (q, x) belong to E.
-We denote by G * =< V , E > the digraph of the strongly connected component of G: V is the set of strongly connected components of G and (C, C ) ∈ E if and only if there is at least one process p ∈ C and one process q ∈ C such that ( p, q) ∈ E. -We say that C ∈ V is a sink of G if there is no edge going out of C. Note that this means that, if p ∈ C and ( p, q) ∈ E, then q ∈ C. -For correct process p in V , we denote by G| p =< W, F > the restriction of G to p: W is the set of all x ∈ V such that there is a path in G from p to x and (x, y) is in F if (x, y) is in E. As for G, we define the sinks of G| p by locating its strongly connected components without outgoing edges.
It is easy to see that G has exactly one sink S, which is also the unique sink of every restriction G| p to any correct process p. We describe below an algorithm where every process p uses * { L |L ∈ L} to eventually construct graph G| p above and output in a variable Trust p a correct process from its sink S which will be the same for all correct processes (emulating the output of ).
Every process p periodically performs the following: Let τ 0 be a time after which no process crashes and the output of failure detectors L , L ∈ L, does not change. As any change in Trust p comes from changes in the output of L 's, and no message is lost, then there is a time τ 1 ≥ τ 0 after which Trust p does not change.
We consider the digraph G p obtained by a correct process p after time τ 1 . G p has all the processes as vertexes, including faulty ones. If an edge has a crashed process as source, this edge is constructed from the output of L before time τ 1 . When we consider G p | p, we remove crashed processes from the set of vertexes, but we do not obtain G because we might have also removed some correct processes. We show in the following that G| p = G p | p.
LEMMA 4. If x is a correct process, then (x, y) is an edge of G p if and only if (x, y) is an edge of G.
PROOF. If x is a correct process, then after time τ 1 , Leader x p is the set of leaders of x for some L such that x ∈ L.
LEMMA 5. The set of vertexes of G p | p is a subset of correct(F).
PROOF. Let y be any vertex of G p | p. There is a path from p to y:
As p is correct and s 1 is the leader by L for some L that contains p, then s 1 is a correct process. By an easy induction, each s i is a correct process.
PROOF. By Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, G p | p is a subgraph of G| p. We now prove that G| p is also a subgraph of G p | p.
Let v be any vertex of G| p; by construction of G| p (1) v is correct, and (2) there is a path from p to v. By Lemma 4, this path is also a path in G p , which implies that v is a vertex of G p | p.
Let (x, y) be any edge of G| p; by construction of G| p, there is a path in G from p to x, and an edge from x to y. By Lemma 4, this path and this edge are also in G p . Let P be the set of vertexes in this path. From all the vertexes z in P ∪ {y}, there is a path from p to z in G p , which means that P ∪ {y} is a subset of the vertexes of
Hence, the (unique) sink of G p | p is also the unique sink S of G| p. As the unique sink of G| p is also the unique sink of G, all correct processes extract S. As S is a non-empty subset of correct processes, all correct processes eventually output the same correct process.
In particular, for the family of subsets of two elements:
The Weakest Failure Detector to Implement a Register
4.1. OVERVIEW. We focus in this section on the basic register type. This object has two operations, read() and write(), and its sequential specification stipulates that a read() returns the last value written.
Consider any subset S of processes in the system . We define a S-register as one where any process in S can read or write: the processes outside S cannot. When S is the overall set of processes, such a register is sometimes called a multi-writer/multi-reader register [Lamport 1986 ] (or simply a register).
We prove in this section the following result:
PROPOSITION 8.
S is the weakest failure detector to implement a S-register.
A direct corollary of this proposition is that is the weakest failure detector to implement a register.
The rest of the section is about proving the proposition. Our proof is based on the existence of two algorithms.
(1) (Necessary condition) Our first algorithm, denoted R, emulates the output of failure detector S using any algorithm A that implements a S-register, that is, R extracts S from A. It is important at this point to notice that R does not use a S-register as a black-box, but it actually uses the algorithm implementing it. In some sense, R uses an open register that reveals information about its message passing implementation. The basic idea of algorithm R is the following. Every process p ∈ S periodically writes in the S-register, triggering executions of A. For every such write w, process p tracks the processes that participate in w; namely, processes that send a A message that causally [Lamport 1978] follow the invocation of w and precede the return of w. As we will explain, this enables p to extract from A quorums of processes and emulate the output of failure detector S at p. (2) (Sufficient condition) Our second algorithm uses S to implement a S-register.
The algorithm is an adaptation of a classical implementation of a register in a message passing system with a majority of correct processes [Attiya et al. 1995] . Instead of the assumption of a majority of correct processes, we simply use S .
PRELIMINARIES ABOUT REGISTERS.
Before exhibiting the algorithms underlying our proof, we introduce below a particular S-register. We consider a S-register that can be read by all processes in S and written by exactly one process p in S (the writer), and which we call a ( p, S)-register.
We assume that different write operations store different values in the register: this can simply be achieved by appending to every value the identity of the writer process together with some local timestamp. We say that a value has been written (respectively read) if the corresponding write (respectively read) has returned a reply (i.e., was terminated). We assume that the register initially contains a specific value ⊥. For uniformity of presentation, we assume that this value was initially written by the writer.
Along the lines of Attiya et al. [1995] , Attiya and Welch [1998] , and Herlihy and Wing [1990] , the correctness of an implementation of an atomic ( p, S)-register can be conveniently expressed through three properties.
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-(1) Termination (liveness). If a correct process of S invokes an operation, the operation eventually terminates. -(2) Validity (safety 1): Every read operation returns either the value written by the last write that precedes it, or a value written concurrently with this read. -(3) Ordering (safety 2): If a read operation r precedes a read operation r then r cannot return a value written before the value returned by r .
4.3. NECESSARY CONDITION. We describe in the following our extraction algorithm R: this uses any algorithm A that implements a S-register to emulate the output of failure detector S . The emulation is achieved within a distributed variable, denoted by Trust (the local value of Trust at process p is denoted by Trust p ). When a query is invoked by a process p to access the value of failure detector S that is emulated, it returns the value of Trust p . Algorithm R ensures that variable Trust satisfies the completeness and intersection properties of S .
When executing R, every process p of S is associated with exactly one ( p, S)-register, denoted by Reg p : p is the only writer of Reg p and all processes of S read in Reg p . Unless it crashes, process p goes through an infinite number of epochs: 1, 2, . . . , k, . . . At every epoch, p performs a write phase and then a read phase. The goal of these phases is to select a list of processes that are used to update Trust p . We give a high-level description of these phases as well as their pseudo-code.
(1) Write Phase. Process p periodically initiates the writing in Reg p of the current epoch number k (together with a specific value that we will discuss below). In turn, this writing (which we denote write(k,*)) triggers the execution of an instance of algorithm A (implementing Reg p ). Process p then tracks the messages it receives on behalf of A in order to select a list of participating processes denoted by P p (k). This set is determined by having every process that receives some message m in the context of write(k,*) from p, tags every message that causally [Lamport 1978 ] follows m, with (a) k, (b) p, as well as with (c) the list of processes from which messages have been received with those tags. When p terminates write(k,*), it looks at all messages it received and gathers from those tagged with k the set P p (k) (to which p also belongs). There are two important properties of sets P p (k).
-If there is at least one correct reader, then P p (k) contains at least one correct process, for otherwise the value written could disappear and the reader would not be able to read it. Thus, if p is correct or at least one reader is correct, then P p (k) contains at least one correct process. -Eventually, if p is correct, then there is a k after which every P p (k) contains only correct processes. This is because, after all faulty processes have crashed, the processes that participate in new write operations are necessarily correct. (2 P q (l). Process p then selects all processes that send such an ack message. We denote this set by Q p (k).
There are also two important properties to highlight here.
-If p is correct, then there is at least one correct reader of all registers and, as previously pointed out, every P q (k) contains at least one correct process. So, p indeed receives a message from one process in every set E q and does not block forever. If process p is correct, then it terminates every read phase of every epoch k and determines a set Q p (k). -Eventually, if p is correct, then there is an epoch k after which every Q p (k) contains only correct processes. This is because, after all faulty processes have crashed, the processes that respond to ( ping, k) a specification customized to our needs. Then, Figure 2 shows how to implement this specific open register with any algorithm that implements a S-register in a message passing system.
The open S-register has a traditional read but a nontraditional write operations. (The register has one writer so this nontraditional write can be performed by only one process.) The write has, besides any possible input parameter that the writer might want to store in the register, a specific input parameter: an integer that the writer uses to indicate the number of times the write operation has been invoked, that is, the epoch number. Furthermore, the write returns an output, which is the list of processes that participated in the write, that is, the processes that replied to messages sent on behalf of the underlying message passing algorithm A implementing the register.
We first define here more precisely what participate means. Let w be some write operation invoked by some writer process p in the white-box ( p, S)-register we consider; w b , respectively, w e , denote the beginning event, respectively the termination event of the write operation w. Let be the causality relation of Lamport [1978] . The set of participants in w, P(w), is the following set of processes:
{q ∈ |∃e event of q : w b e w e } The algorithm of Figure 2 tracks and returns the set of participants in every write(k,*) operation. Let p be the writer of a ( p, S)-register Reg p and consider an algorithm A implementing this register (possibly using some failure detector). We tag every message causally after the beginning of the kth write of Reg p and causally before the beginning of the k + 1th write with a pair (k, L L) where L L is the list of participants to the kth write.
The following lemma states that the set of processes returned by the algorithm of Figure 2 at the end of the kth write by process p is indeed the set of processes that participate in the write. More precisely, let P p (k) be the value returned by the algorithm of Figure 2 for the kth write, we have: LEMMA 9. In the algorithm of Figure 2 , the set of participants of the kth terminated write of Reg p is the value returned for P p (k).
PROOF. Let w the kth terminated write of p.
(1) We first show that P(w) ⊆ P p (k). Let x be any process of P(w). There exists an event e of x such that w b e w e . Let M 1 be the causal chain of messages from w b to e and M 2 be the causal chain from e to w e . All messages in M 1 or M 2 can only be tagged by ( j, * ) with j ≥ k. As p does not begin the jth write, with j > k, before the end of the kth write, all messages of M 2 are tagged by (k, * ). Moreover, an easy induction proves that every message in M 2 has tag (k, K ) such that x is in K . As the tags of these messages are in P p (k), we have x ∈ P p (k). (2) Now we prove that P p (k) ⊆ P(w). Let x be any process of P p (k). As only x can add its identity to the list L L of the tag (k, L L) of a message, any p u can only receive a message with tag (k, L L) such that x ∈ L L only causally after that x sends some message with tag (k, M) with x ∈ M. Let e 0 be the event corresponding to the first time x sends a message with tag (k, L L) and let e 1 be the event corresponding to the first time p receives a message with tag (k, M) for some M with x ∈ M, we have: e 0 e 1 . Moreover, as x ∈ P p (k), the algorithm ensures that e 1 w e and then (1) e 0 w e . As only p increments the value of j in tag ( j, * ), and the value of Current for x can only be set to k when x receives a message with tag (k, * ). As in e 0 the value of Current for x is k, we have: (2) w b e 0 .
From (1) and (2), e 0 is an event of x such that w b e 0 w e . Hence, x ∈ P(w).
The following lemma states that any set of processes participating to some write contains at least one correct process.
LEMMA 10. Let w be the kth terminated write of p in some failure pattern F, if S ∩ correct(F)
PROOF. Remember that we assume any two different write operations store two different values. Notice first that p ∈ P p (k) for all k, hence: -if p is correct, then the lemma is trivial. -if p is faulty and all the readers are faulty, then the lemma is also trivial.
In order to obtain a contradiction, assume that, for some terminating write w of p in register Reg p , some run α =< F, C, Sc, T > and some associated failure detector history H , we have a correct reader, say q, and P p (k) ∩ correct(F) = ∅.
In the following, we exhibit several runs; all have F as failure pattern and H as associated failure detector history. They may differ from α by the time at which processes take steps (we use the fact that the system is asynchronous).
-Run α 0 . This run is identical to α up to w e , and the writer p does not invoke any write after w e . The set of participants in w, P p (k), is the same in α and α 0 . Let v be the value of register Reg p before the terminating write w, and v the value after w (recall that we assume v = v ).
Let τ e be the time of the event w e of α, and consider time τ ≥ τ e after which no more processes crash. Note that, by hypothesis, at time τ all participants of w have crashed. For any process x in P p (k), let b x be the first event of x such that w b b x w e , and e x be the last event of x such that w b e x w e . In the following, b x , x does not take any step until time τ . As after time τ , x has crashed, x does not take any step after b −1
x . The processes of − P p (k), in particular q, take steps exactly as in α 0 up to time τ (at the same time, but perhaps the step is not the same). At time τ , q reads the register Reg p and q ends the read at time τ . As w is not in run β, then q reads v in the register. -Run γ . For any process x of P p (k), γ is identical to α 0 up to e x . After e x , x does not take any step until time τ . If after b x , x sends a message to a process of − P p (k), the reception of this message is delayed until after time τ . Processes of − P p (k) take steps exactly as in β up to time τ (the steps that these processes take in γ and β are the same steps up to time τ ). After time τ , the correct processes may receive the pending messages: runs β and γ may then differ.
In γ , the writer has completed its write operation w. The reader q begins the read after the end of the write, by the atomicity of the S-register, q reads v . then, for all k < k, P p (k ) ∈ E p . By construction, the value of E p (Line 11) for the k-th write of register p is the set of all sets P p (k ) for k < k. -It is clear from Lines 13, 19 and 20 that for every process r every integer m P r (m − 1) ⊆ Trust m r . As each process p writes in its own register Reg p , and then reads every register of all other processes, due to the atomicity of registers, either the kth write of the register Reg q by q is before the lth read of this register by process p, or the l-write of register Reg p is before the kth read of this register by process q. Assume without loss of generality that p performs its lth read of register Reg q after the kth write of Reg q by q. From the algorithm, at least one s ∈ Trust l p (1) comes from each set of the set of sets L q read by p in the lth read of Reg q , and (2) is such that p has received an (l, O K ) answer from s. As we assume that the lth read is after the end of the kth write of Reg q by q, we deduce that at least one s ∈ Trust l p belongs to P q (k − 1) and, as P q (k − 1) ⊆ Trust 
PROOF. Let p be any process in S. Local variable

SUFFICIENT CONDITION. A special case of a ( p, S)-register is a register
that can be read by exactly one process q (the reader) and written by exactly one process p (called the writer). We call it a ( p, q)-register: when S is , the register corresponds to a single-writer/single-reader register in the sense of Lamport [1986] .
In the following, we describe an algorithm that, for any p, q ∈ S, implements a (p, q)-register using S . Using the register transformations of Israeli and Li [1993] and Vitanyi and Awerbuch [1986] , we derive the fact that a S-register can be implemented, using ( p, q)-registers for all p, q ∈ S.
Basically, each process maintains the current value of the register. The writer process tags each write invocation with a unique sequence number, incremented for every new write invocation. In order to perform its read (respectively, write) operation, the reader p r (respectively, the writer p w ) sends a message to all processes and waits until it receives acknowledgments from every process trusted by p r (respectively, p w ), that is, output by its failure detector module. It is important to notice that the set of processes trusted by the reader (respectively, the writer) might change between the time the reader (respectively, the writer) sends its message and the time it receives acknowledgments. We implicitly assume here that the reader (respectively, the writer) keeps periodically consulting the list of processes that are output by its failure detector module (i.e., the trusted processes) and stops waiting when the reader (respectively, the writer) has received acknowledgments from all processes in the list.
For every write operation, the writer sends the value to be written with the associated sequence number to all processes. Each process p stores this value with its sequence number and sends back an acknowledgment to the writer, unless p has crashed or has already stored a value with a higher sequence number.
For every read operation, the reader sends a request to read to all. Every process that does not crash returns an acknowledgment containing the last value written and the corresponding sequence number. The reader then selects the value with the largest sequence number among those received from the trusted processes and the one previously hold by the reader. Finally, the reader updates its own value and timestamp with the selected value and returns it.
Roughly speaking, the completeness property of S ensures that, unless it crashes, the reader (respectively, the writer) does not block waiting forever for acknowledgments. The intersection property ensures that a reader would not miss a value that was written.
LEMMA 13. The algorithm of Figure 3 implements a ( p w , p r )-register using S such that p w , p r ∈ S. PROOF. We consider one writer, denoted by p w , and one reader, denoted by p r . In the pseudo-code of Figure 3 , we assume that the if...then... statement is atomic.
Remark first that:
-(A). If p w has not terminated its k-th write (after Line 17) then, at all processes, the value of variable last write is less or equal to k.
Indeed, the last write is updated according to the value obtained from some write operation. As read/write invocations are sequential on each process, the writer does not begin its (k + 1)-th write operation before ending its kth one.
Assume that the kth write by p w is for value v. We have:
-(B) When a process writes k in its last write variable (Line 8) the value of its current variable is v.
From this, we deduce the following:
-(C) If any process sends an (ACK READ, s, v, * ) message, then v is the value of the sth write operation.
In particular, (C) implies that for all (ACK READ, s, v, * ) forever in Line 17. From the completeness property of the failure detector, there is a time τ after which the list M of processes trusted by p w contains only correct processes. By the properties of the message passing service, every correct process p eventually receives the (WRITE, * , k) message from p w . From (A), p replies with an (ACK WRITE, k) message and p w eventually receives (ACK WRITE, k) messages from all processes within M -a contradiction. A similar argument proves that, unless the reader crashes, every read operation invoked by the reader always terminates.
Validity. Let R be the jth read operation invoked by the reader, let W be the last write operation terminated before the beginning of R, and assume that W is the kth write of the writer. The writer p w terminates this write operation (after Line 17) after having received (ACK WRITE, k) messages from a set L w of trusted processes. When the reader p r terminates its read operation R, p r has received (ACK READ, * , * , j) messages from a list L r of trusted processes. By the intersection property of the failure detector, at least one process p belongs to both L w and L r .
As p sends an (ACK READ, s, * , j) message to p r only after having sent an (ACK WRITE, k) message to p w , then s ≥ k. Hence, let a be the maximum of v in the (ACK READ, v, * , j) messages received by the reader p r for operation R, we have a ≥ s ≥ k and then: (D) a ≥ k. From (A), the ath write has begun before read R has terminated, and by (C) the value returned by R is the value of the ath write.
Consider the two following cases:
-The read operation R is not concurrent with any write operation. Hence, from (A), (ACK READ, x, * , j) messages received by p r for R are such that x ≤ k. From (D), we can deduce that a = k and the value returned by R is the value of write W . -The read is concurrent with some write. In this case, a ≥ k. The value returned is either the value of write W or the value of some concurrent write.
In the same way, this proof applies if there is no write before the jth read operation.
Ordering. Assume that the reader reads x then y and let r x, respectively r y, be the corresponding values of last write for the reader. From the algorithm, x is the written value by the r x-th write and y is the written value by the r y-th write. As last write is nondecreasing, we have r y ≥ r x, hence, p w wrote y after x.
Using the register transformations of Israeli and Li [1993] and Vitanyi and Awerbuch [1986] , we can now derive the fact that S-registers can be implemented out of ( p, q)-registers for all p, q ∈ S. We finally get: LEMMA 14. There is an algorithm that implements a S-register using S for any subset S.
With Lemma 12, we get our complete proof. The following is then a simple corollary of Proposition 8:
is the weakest failure detector to implement a register.
The Weakest Failure Detector to Implement Consensus
We determine here the weakest failure detector to implement the consensus object type. Our result applies to all environments, including those where more than half of the processes might crash, as well as to any consensus object shared by a subset of processes in the system. We later derive the weakest failure detector to implement any object type with consensus number k > 1.
5.1. IMPLEMENTING CONSENSUS. The sequential specification of the consensus object stipulates that all propose() operations return one of the values proposed. For any subset S of processes in the system, we define S-consensus as a consensus object accessible only to the processes of S: the propose() operation of S-consensus can only be invoked by the processes of S.
In this section, we prove that S * S is the weakest failure detector to implement S-consensus. As a direct corollary, * is the weakest failure detector to implement consensus (shared by all the processes in the system ).
PROPOSITION 16.
S * S is the weakest failure detector to implement Sconsensus.
PROOF.
Overview. In order to prove that S * S is the weakest failure detector to implement S-consensus, we first prove (necessary condition) that, from any implementation of S-consensus, we can extract both S and S and then (sufficient condition) we exhibit an algorithm that implements S-consensus using S * S .
(1) We prove the necessary condition in two steps. We show first how to extract S (necessary condition (a)) and then how to extract S (necessary condition (b)).
-Proving the first step of the necessary condition (a) goes essentially through the same steps as the necessary part of the proof of the weakest failure detector for consensus ] (i.e., -consensus). Interestingly the fact that S can be a subset of processes does not fundamentally change the proof. We will mainly recall the main steps of the proof of and point out some special cases that are sensitive to our generalization. -To prove the second step of the necessary condition (b), we use the traditional fault-tolerant state machine replication approach [Lamport 1998; Schneider 1986 ], transforming consensus into the total order broadcast communication abstraction and implementing any object type, including the type register. (2) To prove the sufficient condition, we give an algorithm that implements S-consensus using S * S . The algorithm can be viewed as a variant of the rotating coordinator algorithm of where the notion of majority is replaced by S . As in , processes are considered coordinators in a round-robin way and they each try to impose a decision. Eventually, one of the correct processes remains coordinator (the one output by S ) and succeeds in imposing a decision. Agreement is ensured because no process decides until it consults a quorum of processes: this is where S is used.
Preliminaries. Before diving into our algorithm, we first precise the meaning of implementing consensus. A correct implementation of a S-consensus object can be defined through three properties, along the lines of Fischer et al. [1985] .
Every process p ∈ S can propose a value to S-consensus and, unless it crashes, p is supposed to decide a value (i.e., return a value from that invocation) such that: -Termination (liveness): Every correct process in S eventually decides; -Agreement (safety 1): For any two processes p and p in S, if p decides v and p decides v then v = v ; -Validity (safety 2): If any process in S decides a value v, then v is the proposed value of some process in S.
In the following, we assume, without loss of generality, that if a correct process invokes some S-consensus object, then all correct processes of S participate to the implementation of that object. More precisely, we assume that all processes obey the following procedure. Let A be any algorithm that implements S-consensus.
When a process p invokes propose() on the object, and p is not already running A, then p sends a message containing its proposed value to all other processes in S and p starts running A. When a process q receives such a message from p, if q is not already running A, then q adopts the value proposal of p as its initial proposal and sends it to all other processes in S, before q itself runs A. When a decision is made in A at some process p, either p has invoked propose() and the decided value by A is the value return by propose(), or the decided value is stored in case p invokes propose() on the S-consensus object in which case the decision value is immediately returned. (Necessary condition (a) ) Extracting S from S-consensus.
LEMMA 17. If there is an implementation of S-consensus using
PROOF (SKETCH). As we pointed out, we mainly go through the main steps of the proof of and discuss how it generalizes to subsets S.
In , all correct processes need to eventually output a correct process p * . In our case, all processes in S have to output the same correct process p * . The way processes in eventually locate the same correct process is by executing an extraction algorithm, which is composed of two parts: the communication component and the computation component. As we will recall below, the goal of the communication component is to exchange values of the underlying failure detector D and build a directed acyclic graph (DAG) of such values, whereas the goal of the computation component is to use the DAG and simulate runs of S-consensus that will help extract the correct process p * . In our case, processes that are not in S are involved only in the communication component.
Consider a set S of processes. Let E be any environment, D be any failure detector that implements S-consensus in E through some algorithm we denote by Consensus The processes periodically query their failure detector and exchange information about the values of H D they see in the run.
Using this information, all processes construct a directed acyclic graph (DAG) that represents a sampling of failure detector values in H D and some temporal relationships between the sampled values. By periodically sending the current state of its DAG to all processes, and by incorporating information from all others processes into its own DAG, every correct process constructs ever increasing approximations of one (infinite) limit DAG G.
In the computation component, the DAG G is used to simulate runs of Consensus The main point is that, from G , it is possible for the correct processes of S to extract the identity of a correct process, say p * . To do so, each vertex of every tree of G is tagged with 0 and 1: A vertex V is tagged with k if and only if it has a descendant V such that some process in S has decided k in V . As all processes (correct or faulty) that decide, decide on the same value, we can take the decision value of any process in S.
i denotes the tagged tree
Remark that a vertex is either tagged with {1} or {0} or {1, 0}. In the first case, the vertex is said to be 1-valent, in the second 0-valent and in the third case bivalent.
By the validity property of S-consensus, the root of 0 is 0-valent and the root of k is 1-valent. By an easy induction, there exists an index i such that either the root of i is bivalent, or the root of i−1 is 0-valent and the root of i is 1-valent. In the second case, it is proved ] that q i is the correct process p * .
In the first case, locating p * is more complicated. In , it is shown that i contains a special subtree, named a decision gadget. Intuitively, in a decision gadget, the step of a particular process is crucial. The first process to be involved in such a gadget is p * . From a bivalent vertex, one of its step, directly or indirectly, leads to a 0-valent vertex and another step to a 1-valent vertex. This process is necessarily a correct process. Notice that the decision gadget is in a finite subgraph of G .
Each process in S tries to extract p * . But since the limit of its forest over time is G , and the information necessary to select p * is in a finite subgraph of G , eventually the process will keep forever selecting the same correct process p * .
(Necessary condition (b)) Extracting S from S-consensus.
LEMMA 18. If there is an implementation of S-consensus using D, then S
D.
PROOF. Let X be any algorithm implementing S-consensus using failure detector D. With X , we can implement [Hadzilacos and Toueg 1993] a total order broadcast abstraction [Aguilera et al. 2000] that is restricted to S. We first recall the specification of this abstraction in terms of the primitives S-ABroadcast and S-ADeliver: (Sufficient condition) Implementing S-consensus with S * S . The algorithm of Figure 5 implements S-consensus using failure detector S * S . The idea of the algorithm is the following. Processes are promoted coordinators in a roundrobin way and they each try to impose a decision. These coordinators do not need to be in S.
The key to ensuring agreement is for the coordinator process to always propose for decision a value adopted by a quorum of processes output by S , and only impose the decision if a quorum of processes output by S adopts that value (not necessarily the same quorum). Note that the processes in a quorum do not need to be in S. Eventually, one of the processes remains coordinator (the one output by S ) and succeeds in imposing a decision. When proving the correctness of our algorithm, and for convenience purposes, for any process p, we will say that p suspects q by S if the output of S is not q. (1.1) if estFromC p = x for some x = ⊥ then estFromC q ∈ {⊥, x}, (2) If p and q end Line 23 of a round r , then: PROOF.
(1.1): Notice first that for any process q, v q is always a value proposed by some process and obviously v q = ⊥.
If estFromC p = x for some x = ⊥, then p has received one message (ONE, x, r ) from the coordinator p 1+r mod n . By the algorithm, the coordinator p 1+r mod n sends only one message (ONE, * , r ) per round to all processes in S. Either q suspects the coordinator by S and then estFromC q = ⊥, or q does not suspect the coordinator by S and waits for message ONE, and then estFromC q = x.
(2.1): The algorithm ensures that all values in L p come from estFromC q values, hence (2.1) is a direct consequence of (1.1).
(2.2) and (2.3): If L p = {⊥, x} or L p = {x}, then at least one process of S, say u, ends the first part (Lines 15 to 20) of round r , and estFromC u = x. By (1.1), at most two values, ⊥ and x, are sent by processes of S to all processes in Line 21. A process sends (TWO, a, r ) to all processes in S if it has received a message (STORE, a, r ) from some process of S. Then, a = x or a = ⊥. Hence, for any process q that ends round r either L q = {x} or L q = {⊥, x} or L q = {⊥}. This concludes the proof of (2.3). For (2.2), it remains to show that L q = {⊥}.
By the intersection property of S , there is at least one process s output by p and q . The algorithm ensures that s sends at most one message (TWO, * , * ) per round. Then, s sends message (TWO, y, r ) with either y = ⊥ or y = x. As we assume L p = {x}, then y equals to x, proving that x belongs to L q ; by (2.1), this proves (2.3). PROOF. Assume by contradiction that no correct process decides. This means that no correct process decides by Task 2. The completeness property of S * S ensures that no process waits forever in Lines 16 and 22; hence every correct process terminates round r for all r .
By the property of S , there is a time τ after which (1) all faulty processes have crashed and (2) the failure detectors of all correct processes of S output forever the same correct process, say p l .
Consider the set of rounds R in which the correct processes of S reach τ and let r be the greatest element of R. Let r 0 be the first round number greater than r in which p l is the coordinator ( p l = 1 + r 0 mod n). When the processes of S are in round r 0 , they do not suspect coordinator p l of round r 0 by S . Then, the processes adopt for estFromC the value sent by p l . And so their L is reduced to one element which is different from ⊥ and they decide -a contradiction. PROOF. Let T be any type emulating 2-consensus. This means that there is an algorithm using T that implements 2-consensus (i.e., consensus among any pair of processes). Clearly, this algorithm with any failure detector D implementing T implements 2-consensus too and, by Corollary 26, it implements consensus. Then, by Proposition 16 we get: (a) * D. Remark that * implements any number of instances of consensus. Hence, using the universality result of consensus [Herlihy 1991 ], we derive that * implements any type. Then by (a) any failure detector that implements T implements any type proving (2). Moreover, as * implements any type, it implements in particular T . Together with (a), this proves (1).
An interesting application of Proposition 27 concerns the notion of consensus number, as we discuss below.
In fact, several definitions of the notion of consensus number of a type T (sometimes also called consensus power) have been be considered [Jayanti 1993 ]. All are based on the maximum number k of processes for which there is an algorithm that, using T , emulates k-consensus. The definitions differ on whether or not the implementation can use several instances of T , and whether the type register can also be used. Notation h 1 means one instance and no register, h From Proposition 27, the weakest failure detector to implement type T such that h 1 (T ) = 2 or h m (T ) = 2 is * . If T is deterministic, we can derive from Bazzi et al. [1997] that h m (T ) = h r m (T ). Hence, we get the following result: PROPOSITION 28. For every k such that 2 ≤ k ≤ n, * is the weakest failure detector to implement (1) any type T such that k = h 1 (T ), (1') any type T such that k = h m (T ), (2) any deterministic type T such that k = h r 1 (T ), and (2') any deterministic type T such that k = h r m (T ).
Failure Detectors Comparisons
In this section, we compare failure detectors S and S . We assume that S contains at least two processes for, otherwise, the failure detectors are trivial. We show that, in a system of at least three processes with a majority of correct processes S is strictly weaker than S . Without the majority assumption, but still in a system of at least three processes, the two failure detectors are incomparable. In a system of two processes, the two failure detectors are equivalent.
Consider first a system with a majority of correct processes: that is, consider environment E t with t ≤ (n −1)/2. In this case, S can directly be implemented using the algorithm of Figure 6 (without any failure detector). In this algorithm, for each round r , each correct process p ∈ S is ensured to receive (ARE YOU ALIVE, r ) messages from a majority of processes. The completeness and intersection properties of S follow directly from the algorithm of Figure 6 and the majority assumption.
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We have: PROPOSITION 29. If n > 2, (1) S * S is strictly stronger than S in every environment E t with t > 0 and (2) S * S is strictly stronger than S in every environment E t with t > (n − 1)/2. PROOF. For any pair of failure detectors (A, B) A * B is stronger than A and stronger than B. In particular, S * S is stronger than S and stronger than S . We thus need to show that there is no algorithm that implements S * S using solely S nor S .
Assume by contradiction that there is an algorithm that can use only S to implement S * S in environment E t . Note that this algorithm would induce an algorithm that can use S to implement S * S in environment E 1 , the set of failure patterns with at most one faulty process. In environment E 1 , if the number of processes is greater than 2, we have a majority of correct processes and S can be implemented without any failure detector. This means S * S can be implemented in E 1 without any failure detector. By Proposition 16, S-consensus would then be implementable without any failure detector. But if S contains more than one process and if at most one process can crash, with S-consensus it is easy to implement consensus for t = 1: processes in S send the decision value to all and processes outside S decide this value. We then get a contradiction with Fischer et al. [1985] .
We prove now that no algorithm can use only S to implement S * S in environments E t with t > (n − 1)/2. Assume by contradiction that such algorithm exists. By Proposition 16, S-consensus would be implementable with only failure detector S . But this contradicts the following Lemma:
LEMMA 30. There is no S-consensus algorithm with S in any environment E t with t > (n − 1)/2. PROOF OF LEMMA. We use the same partitioning technique as in . Let by contradiction A be a S-consensus algorithm with S for such environments. Let A and B be any disjoint subsets of such that A and B contains each at least one process in S and the cardinalities of A and B are less than or equal to n/2 . Note that in this case, t is greater or equal to n/2 and then all processes not in A or not in B may crash.
Consider run α A in which all processes have initial value 0, all processes in A are correct, all other processes are initially crashed and let time t A be the time at which all processes in A ∩ S decide (this decision is 0).
Consider run α B in which all processes have initial value 1, all processes in B are correct, all other processes are initially crashed and let time t B be the time at which all processes in B ∩ S decide (this decision is 1).
Consider run α in which (1) all processes in A and in B are correct, (2) all processes in A have 0 as initial value, (3) all processes in B have 1 as initial value, (4) the output of failure detector is the same as in α A for processes in A up to time t A and as in α B for processes in B up to time t B , (5) the reception of all messages from processes in A to processes in B and the reception of all messages from processes in B to processes in A are delayed until after time max(t A , t B ), (6) up to time max(t A , t B ) processes in A, respectively in B, take steps at the same times as in α A , respectively as in α B .
Run α is indistinguishable from α A to processes in A ∩ S and then processes in A ∩ S decide 0 in α. In the same way, however, α is indistinguishable from α B for processes in B ∩ S and then processes in B ∩ S decide 1 in α, contradicting the agreement property.
COROLLARY 31. For n > 2, in environments E t with 0 < t < (n − 1)/2, S is strictly stronger than S and in environments E t with t ≥ (n − 1)/2 S and S are incomparable.
The n > 2 hypothesis is crucial in the proof above. Maybe surprisingly, in a system of 2 processes, * and are equivalent. To prove this, we go through an intermediate failure detector: the Strong failure detector (S) introduced in and . (S) ensures strong completeness, that is, eventually every process that crashes is permanently suspected by every correct process, and weak accuracy, that is, some correct process is never suspected. This failure detector and MP implements consensus whatever the number of faulty processes. Furthermore, as shown in and , S is stronger than .
PROPOSITION 32. For n = 2, S ≡ .
PROOF. (1)
S: By definition, S ensures strong completeness and some correct process is never suspected. Hence, S ensures the intersection property. Then,
S. (2) S
: Denote by p 1 and p 2 the two processes of the system. Consider any failure pattern F. If no process crashes in F, then by the intersection property of , one correct process is trusted forever by p 1 and p 2 . If some process, say p 1 , crashes, then by the completeness property of , after some time τ , p 2 is the only process trusted by p 2 . By the intersection property of , p 2 has been trusted forever by p 1 and p 2 . Therefore, in all cases, at least one correct process is never suspected. This proves the accuracy property of S. By definition, ensures strong completeness. Hence, S .
The following holds in any environment and is a direct corollary of the proposition above and the fact that S : COROLLARY 33. For n = 2, ≡ * .
Concluding Remarks
We show in this article that the information about failures that is necessary and sufficient to implement types like queue and test-and-set, is the same as the information that is necessary and sufficient to implement types like compare-andswap and consensus. All these types are in a precise sense equivalent, according to the information about failures needed to implement them. We show however that, according to this metric, these types are strictly harder to implement than the basic register type in a system of at least three processes. Maybe surprisingly, in a system of two processes, we prove that the necessary and sufficient information about failures to implement a register is the same as that necessary and sufficient to implement consensus. This contrasts with the fact that there is no asynchronous 22:32 C. DELPORTE-GALLET ET AL.
algorithm that implements consensus using registers even in a system of two processes [Loui and Abu-Amara 1987] .
